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Abstract
James Stacey Taylor is an Epicurean who argues that death cannot be bad for the person who
dies. He is also a Hedonist and believes that “everything good or bad lies in sensation, and death
is to be deprived of sensation.” (Taylor 179). Assuming death results in the cessation of experience, it follows that death has no value at all (it
can neither be bad or good for the person who
dies). By contrast, Neil Feit defends Deprivationism, which is the view that death is bad for the
person who dies because it deprives him/her of intrinsic goods that he/she would have experienced
had death not occurred. In this paper, I will argue against Feit’s Deprivationism and in favor of
Epicureanism. I will first review how Feit’s view
depends on a notion where the value (goodness
and badness) of death is relative to other events
that can affect the state of well-being of the person who dies. I will argue that the considerations
in favor of Epicureanism reveal this assumption
about death to be limited. Additionally, I will argue that recognizing the limitation of this claim
and the soundness of Taylor’s arguments for Epicureanism show that death cannot be bad for the
person who dies. Finally, I will evaluate both
arguments in the context of hypothetical real-life
scenarios.
1. Introduction
Epicurus believed that death is not bad for the
person who dies because death means the cessation of that person’s existence, and thus the end
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of any sensations that might cause that person any
negative well-being. The latter point is based on
the premise that, “everything good or bad lies in
sensation, and death is to be deprived of sensation.” (Taylor 179). James Stacey Taylor adopts
this Epicurean point of view and elaborates on the
Hedonic Variant of that argument. The Hedonic
Variant states that: only events or states of affairs
that affect a person’s experiences can have any
effect on his well-being (Taylor 179). He takes
this point further and asserts “The Hedonic View
of harm” which allows that an individual can be
harmed by an event or state of affairs if said individual’s experiences would be better off had such
an event or state of affairs never took place. With
these ideas in mind, one can conclude that death
is not bad for the one who dies because the subject of death has no experiences whatsoever after
death. In other words, once death occurs, there is
no longer an agent by which “harm” can be experienced, so death is not bad for the one who
dies. Neil Feit pushes back on this argument and
asserts that death is bad, at least extrinsically, for
the person who dies because it deprives him/her
of any intrinsic goods that he/she might have experienced had death not occurred (Feit 193). This
thought process is known as the “Deprivation Account” of death. By that account, he develops a
merely relevant relationship in which the goodness or badness of death depends upon: a) the
well-being of the subject after death and b) the different times at which that well-being might be, on
balance, negative or positive. In this paper, I will
argue that Feit’s argument is based on developing
the notion of a relative value (goodness and bad-
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ness) of death to other events that can affect the
state of well-being of the person who dies. Therefore, his argument is both weakened and limited
by a crucial tenet of Taylor’s argument (i.e. the
Epicurean view), which is that death has no value
at all. For this reason, death cannot be bad for the
person who dies. I will use the Hedonic Account
of death and harm to support my claim.
2. The Epicurean View on Death
Before delving into the distinction between the
arguments of Taylor and Feit, I will clarify the
Epicurean view on death in relation to good and
evil. For Epicurus, the death of a person means
the cessation of that person’s conscious awareness. In other words, when people die, they lose
the ability to be aware of their surroundings and
feelings. In this way, they become no longer capable of experiencing good and evil. In his “Letter
to Menoeceus,” he writes, “Accustom yourself to
believe that death is nothing to us, for good and
evil imply awareness, and death is the privation of
all awareness.” (Epicurus 156). If death deprives
the individual of any awareness of good and evil,
then it cannot be deemed evil (or good) for the
person who dies. By that same token, death deprives the individual of the ability to experience
any pleasure or harm, an important premise for
Taylor’s Hedonic View. Death, however, is not
simply the cessation of awareness for Epicurus. In
fact, he describes it as “the most awful of evils.”
(Epicurus 156). Nevertheless, it is an evil that
shouldn’t occupy one’s mind because, following
the notion that it cannot coexist with one’s awareness, it can only exist in the prospect. Therefore,
Epicurus asserts, “whatever causes no annoyance
when it is present, causes only a groundless pain
in the expectation.” (Epicurus 156). Thus, the fear
of death, for example, causes nothing to the individual but pointless pain. Following this idea,
Epicurus further describes death by asserting, “It
is nothing then, either to the living or to the dead,
for with the living it is not and the dead exist no
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longer.” (Epicurus 156). Not only does death hold
no value to the dead, but it should also be of no
value to us, the living. According to Epicurus, this
attitude towards death allows the individual to enjoy the mortal life by removing any desire for immortality or fear of death. In other words, it allows
the individual to experience pleasure in life.
The Epicurean view resists the notion to contemplate about the goodness or badness of death.
It simply asserts that death has no value at all because the person who dies lacks conscious awareness and sensation to determine its value. At the
same time, those who think about death (or similarly fear death) cause groundless pain for themselves. If death has no value at all, then it cannot
be bad (or good) for the person who dies. It is important to note, however, that the Epicurean view
does not oppose mourning the loss of loved ones.
An individual can be disturbed by the loss of a
loved one and still be aligned with the Epicurean
view if his own death is nothing to him/her.
Feit’s Deprivation Account takes the leap and
considers the state of well-being that a deceased
person might have experienced at that time had
death not occurred. This notion gives rise to an
important distinction between his and Taylor’s arguments about death.
3. An Important Distinction Between Feit’s
and Taylor’s Arguments
To account for the idea, propagated by Epicurean philosophers, that existence ceases at the
time in which death takes place, Feit develops
the “Time-Focused Deprivation Account”, which
states: “An event is bad for a person at any given
time if and only if that person would have had a
higher well-being level at that time if the event had
not occurred.” (Feit 200). With this account, he reserves the fact that death is not bad (i.e., good) for
the person who dies if and only if his/her wellbeing would be generally negative had death not
occurred. He argues, following his Time-Focused
Deprivation Account, that an event can be bad for
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a person if it deprives him/her of an intrinsic good
that he/she would have otherwise acquired at any
time had such an event never happened. An intrinsic good is the positive feeling that results from
a state of positive well-being. That is, a state of
being that is good in and of itself. For example, a
conscious, terminally ill patient who gets a chance
to see his family before he dies will experience an
intrinsic good which would be the comfort that results from seeing his family (not seeing his family on its own), making the event of seeing his
family good for him. The comfort of seeing his
family is an intrinsic good for him because it is a
state of well-being that is good in and of itself. If
he dies before he does so, Feit would argue that
death is bad for him because it deprived him from
that positive state of comfort that he would have
otherwise experienced had he not died. Before
delving more into the topic of death, I will illustrate an important distinction between Feit’s argument and that of Taylor’s through a thought experiment. Feit gives the example of a baseball-fan
individual (I will call her Ms. C) whose surprise
baseball tickets were stolen from her mailbox. In
this case, he argues that the theft of the tickets is
bad for her because she would have enjoyed going to that baseball game had the tickets not been
stolen from her. Thus, the event of theft is bad
for Ms. C because it deprived her of a positive
state of well-being at some future time. However,
if we make the assumption that Ms. C ended up
going to the baseball game, and due to unpleasant
events, she eventually hated being there, then Feit
(by that same logic) would argue that the event of
theft was actually good (i.e., not bad) for her because it protected her from a negative state of wellbeing. An important detail of this example is the
fact that Ms. C never knew about the baseball tickets being in her mailbox in the first place. For this
reason, Taylor, according to the Hedonic Account
of Harm, would argue that the theft event had no
effect (neither good nor bad) on Ms. C because it
did not affect any of her experiences whatsoever,
if her life after the theft had happened was bal-
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anced in terms of positive or negative events and
that the baseball event might have tipped the scale
toward one side over the other. Meaning, the theft
of the tickets did not at all impact her mental state
or level of well-being. Based on this premise, we
can say that the theft event was not bad for Ms. C.
Going back to the topic of death, if we replace the event of theft with the event of the sudden death of Ms. C before she finds out about the
tickets, then we can explore what each argument
would conclude in this case. Feit would argue that
death would be bad for her because, at the time
of the game, Ms. C would miss out on a positive state of well-being. However, if we assume
that she gets into a car accident that causes her
a permanent disability right after the game, then
he would argue that death was not a bad thing
(i.e. good) for her because Ms. C’s permanent
disability caused her a critical predicament and
strain ( i.e., a prolonged negative state of wellbeing) on her daily life. Thus, at the time of the
game, death would be bad for her, and after the
game death would be good for her. Therefore,
the Time-Focused Deprivation Account of death
makes the value of death (good or bad) dependent on the well-being of Ms. C relative to the
time in which her well-being would have been impacted by a certain event. Proponents of the Hedonic Account would argue against this view by
stating that Ms. C’s death ends her existence and
thus her ability to become subject to any future
feelings or experiences (like harm). At the same
time, she can no longer be subject to relative comparisons between pre-death and post-death states
of well-being because she cannot experience anything after her death. Thus, death has no value in
relation to Ms. C because she is no longer a “subject” to whom values can be attributed. It is important to note that Hedonists are saying that Ms. C’s
death is not bad only in relation to her. Meaning,
her death can be bad for her relatives and friends
who loved her and will be negatively impacted by
her departure. According to the Hedonic Account,
however, death cannot have a value at all to Ms. C
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herself. So, it is plausible to state that death was
not bad for her.
It, so far, seems that there is a distinction
between Feit’s Deprivationist view and Taylor’s
Hedonic Account; the former makes the value
of death relative to time and a state of wellbeing, while the latter strips death of any values
altogether. Furthermore, the Hedonic Account
negates the existence of any subject after death,
and thus any relativity (to values, time, or wellbeing). In the following section, I will discuss how
Feit counterargues the previous point.
4. The Timing Argument in The Context of
Hedonism
The Hedonic Timing Argument is one that
goes against the Time-Focused Deprivation Account because it holds the Epicurean premise that,
“Nothing can be bad for a person when that person
does not exist.” (Feit 198). Feit argues against that
premise and attempts to prove that even though a
person does not exist, death can still be bad for
that person. He utilizes the “subsequentism” argument which states that things can be bad for a
person after they happen. By the nature of death
itself, it can only be bad (or good) for a person after it takes place. Following that logic, any times
(which is not necessarily all times) that death has
caused that person to be deprived of positive states
of well-being are times when death is definitely
bad for that person. Thus, Feit achieves his goal
and proves that although a person no longer exists, death can still be bad for him/her relative to
the timing and the state of well-being that follows death. In other words, he proves that after
the event of death, and despite the fact that the
person no longer exists to experience anything,
missing out on events that might have conferred
positive states of well-being on the person who
dies (relative to other states of negative well-being
that might have happened before or after death)
is bad for that person. Since death is the reason
that caused that person to miss out on these pos-
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itive states of well-being, it is bad for the person
who dies. However, in the context of the Hedonic
Account, his argument seems implausible because
his conclusion must follow from the premise that
death occurs. At the moment that death occurs,
relativity or the value of death becomes irrelevant
to the dead person. Meaning, the occurrence of
death denies any values or relativities (e.g., comparison between positive and negative events) in
time and space that can be attributed to the person who dies because he/she can no longer be a
subject to them.
Going back to Ms. C. If we stretch our imagination and create a parallel world in which Ms.
C was the only human being alive. She lives in
a “scientific vacuum” that maintains all requirements of life. To clarify, she is the only human
alive with no knowledge of language, emotions,
sounds, etc. Accordingly, she has no past, present,
or future (time is irrelevant) and also no experiences whatsoever (besides basic human functions). How can her death, then, be evaluated by
both the Hedonic and the Time-Focused Deprivation accounts? I think that the Time-Focused Deprivation Account would fail to provide any evaluation because the account rests on the premises
that:
1. A person lives a life with a baseline state of a
well-being (good or bad)
2. Death can be evaluated as good or bad if a hypothetical post-mortem life is better or worse
than the pre-mortem one.
Since relativities/comparisons and values like
good, bad, positive, or negative have no context
in Ms. C’s life in the vacuum, as she is the only
person alive with no relativity to a certain point
in time, a Deprivationist would be stuck on how to
evaluate her death in this case because the vacuum
prevents Ms. C from having any comprehension
of good and bad due to the fact that there are no
contrasts that exist in the vacuum whatsoever. To
elaborate more on this idea of contrasts, we can
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know the goodness and badness of things by experiencing one or the other. To illustrate, Jack was
told by his mother to not touch the hot stove because it will cause him pain. Let us assume that he
defies his mother’s instructions and still touches
the hot stove. When he does so, he experiences
pain. At that moment, Jack registers touching the
hot stove as bad (because it leads to pain) and not
touching the hot stove as good (because it does not
cause pain). One might even expand the lesson
as to say that Jack might have learned that listening to his mother is good and not listening to her
is bad. Accordingly, his experience of a bad action revealed to him what a good action might be
like. In Ms. C’s case, however, she would not be
able to comprehend the goodness or badness associated with touching a hot stove or listening to her
mother because these aspects are not part of her
world. Similarly, if she dies, no positive state of
well-being can be attributed to her after death because there are no events that can be good to her,
particularly if all the events before her death were
neutral events (i.e., normal body functions like
eating, etc.) that conferred no negative value on
her well-being. Meaning, a Deprivationist would
not be able to say that death is bad for Ms. C due
to her missing out on positive/good states of wellbeing that would take place after her death because
Ms. C simply never experienced any bad/negative
states of well-being that would allow her to comprehend the difference before her death. Thus, she
cannot be attributed any positive or negative experiences whether before or after her death because
the contrast simply cannot be established in her
case. A proponent of the Hedonic View (and the
Epicurean argument), however, would simply argue that since Ms. C’s existence ended with her
death, she can no longer be a subject to any experiences. In other words, comparisons between her
states of well-being before and after death have
no value to Ms. C because her well-being physically came to a halt after death. Thus, death would
be nothing to her and therefore it cannot be bad
for her. Feit’s argument, unlike Taylor’s, becomes
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limited to the relativity between the baseline state
of well-being before the person dies and the potentially better ones that might take place after that
person’s death, making it the weaker argument
specifically in a case like Ms. C’s vacuum where
her pre-mortem states of well-being (i.e. her baseline well-being) are as much neutral—holding no
value of good or bad—to her as the post-mortem
ones if her life were to be evaluated after her death.
5. The Hedonic Argument, Deprivation Account, and Applied Ethics
Although I have shown that Taylor’s Hedonic
View on death can be more plausible than Feit’s
Time-Focused Deprivation Account in the case the
mental experiment with Ms. C, the world does not
exist in a scientific vacuum. Therefore, it is important to further evaluate the Hedonic View on death
in the context of real-life scenarios, while at the
same time evaluating the Time-Focused Deprivation Account in the same context. One question
that comes to mind: if the Hedonic View states
that death is not bad for the person who dies, does
this have implications for our supposed duties to
the deceased? The Hedonic View (and similarly
the Time-Focused Deprivation Account) is exclusively concerned with the relationship between the
event of death and the person who dies. It does
not dictate, or limit, how individuals related to that
person think or feel about his/her death in the context of each of their independent lives. At the same
time, it does not deny any distress or events of
disturbance that individuals might experience after the loss of a loved one. Consequently, we are
free to act as we see fit, carrying out duties that
we consider proper when it comes to the death of
a loved one. Nonetheless, we ought to believe,
according to the Hedonic View, that death is not
bad for the deceased because they no longer exist
to be ascribed any goodness or badness of events;
we can believe, however, that their death is bad
for us, since we are still alive and thus can experience goodness and badness. To demonstrate
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this logic, let’s assume that Mr. L, a loving husband and father, has passed away recently. Mr.
L’s death, from a Hedonic (or Epicurean) standpoint, is not bad for Mr. L because he no longer
exists to experience good and bad. So, death has
no value for Mr. L and therefore it cannot be bad
(or good) for him. However, it can be bad for Mr.
L’s family because they might experience displeasure in grieving for him. Thus, Mr. L’s death
can confer a negative state of well-being on his
family making his death bad for them. It follows,
then, that they can carry out whatever duties they
see fit to mourn the loss of their family member.
Consequently, the Hedonic View has no particular implications on our supposed duties toward the
deceased because it governs the view on death in
relation to the person who dies only, without any
consideration for the implications of such death on
us. Feit’s Time-Focused Deprivation Account follows a similar reasoning with the caveat that death
is in fact bad for Mr. L because it deprived him
from any states of positive well-being (e.g., enjoying more time with his family) that he might
have experienced at some time had death not taken
place. Similar to the Hedonic View, Mr. L’s death
is bad for his family because it also deprived them
from enjoying more time with their beloved family member.
If we expand Mr. L’s analogy and assume that
he dies due to a painless murder. Would painless
murder, according to the Hedonic View, in this
case be wrong? If the Hedonic premise states that
death is neither bad nor good for Mr. L because
he can longer be a subject to a harmful experience,
then it follows that his painless murder is neither
bad nor good for him. The act itself, however, can
be bad (and therefore wrong), but the Hedonic notion does not lead to that conclusion. Even though
Mr. L’s death cannot be attributed any values in relation to him, the murder might have caused pain
in different ways (i.e., emotionally) for his family.
Thus, the painless murder of Mr. L caused a negative state of well being for his family. The emotional distress and fear of Mr. L’s family caused by
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the murder is intrinsically bad. In other words, Mr.
L’s family would have been better off had the murder not taken place. Thus, it follows that the murder is harmful and therefore wrong in relation to
his family, but not necessarily for Mr. L himself.
An exception to this analogy comes to mind: What
if Mr. L was a “John Doe” with no known relatives. In other words, what if Mr. L hypothetically
lived in social isolation that caused him to have no
relationships with anyone else, so much so that no
one would notice his death. In this extreme scenario, Mr. L’s murder, from a Hedonic standpoint,
would in fact not be wrong (or right) because the
premise that Mr. L’s death is not bad (or good)
for him still holds true because he no longer exists
to be attributed any values of good and bad. At
the same time, since no one alive would experience a negative state of well-being caused by his
death by murder, then the murder cannot be harmful for anyone and therefore cannot be wrong (or
right). It would simply have no value associated
with it from a Hedonic perspective, although it can
still be legally unlawful (i.e., legally wrong). This
extreme scenario reveals a practical ethical limitation to the Hedonic View since it cannot on its
own reveal whether the painless murder of Mr. L
is good or evil. The Time-Focused Deprivation
Account would more firmly assert, in any case,
that the painless murder of Mr. L is wrong because it deprives him of any pleasure that he might
have experienced had the murder not taken place.
It thus seems that both arguments would agree on
the fact the painless murder of Mr. L is wrong in
some way, although the Hedonic View would not
be applicable in all cases as demonstrated.
If Mr. L was a terminally ill patient who got
into a coma recently, would euthanasia be considered bad for him? The Hedonic View would
render death that follows euthanasia to be of no
value to Mr. L. Therefore, it cannot be bad (or
good) for him because he becomes no longer a
subject to whom harm (or no harm) can be attributed. However, if euthanasia ultimately prevents Mr. L’s family to continue seeing him in
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pain, then it confers a positive state of affairs on
his family making his death by euthanasia good
for them. On the other hand, if Mr. L’s euthanasia
causes too much pain and suffering for his family, then it would be bad for them. Differently, the
Time-Focused Deprivation Account would evaluate Mr. L’s well-being before and after euthanasia
on a larger scale. The goodness and badness of
euthanasia in relation to Mr. L would be based
on his state of well-being before and after death
with the latter being relative to the former. That
is, if most of Mr. L’s life was spent suffering in
pain from the symptoms of his illness, then he will
most likely continue suffering had his euthanasia
never happened. In other words, there would be
no higher levels of well-being that he would have
been deprived of had death not occurred. In this
case, euthanasia would be good for him from a
Deprivationist point of view. On the other hand, if
Mr. L experienced the symptoms of his illness toward the end of his life and most of his life caused
him a positive state of well-being, then euthanasia would be bad for him because it would deprive
him from any positive states of well-being that he
might have experienced, like enjoying more time
with his family or listening to music, had death by
euthanasia not occurred, granted that he can experience some form of pleasure during his coma.
We can also attempt to evaluate both the Hedonic View and the Time-Focused Deprivation Account in the context of abortion. Would the death
of a fetus by abortion be considered bad for the
fetus? Proponents of the Hedonic View would assert that the death of a fetus by abortion would
lead to the end of its existence and therefore it becomes unbale to experience any values of good or
bad. In this way, death would be of no value to
the fetus. Consequently, abortion cannot be bad
(or good) for the fetus. Proponents of the TimeFocused Deprivation Account, on the other hand,
would argue that since abortion would deprive the
fetus of any positive states of well-being that it
might experience at a time had abortion not taken
place, then it would be bad for the fetus. What
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if the fetus ends up having a genetic disorder that
would lead to him developing a painful, terminal
illness after birth? What stance would a Deprivationist take in that case? According Feit’s Deprivation Account, if the fetus is expected to not
have a higher level of well-being after birth due
to its illness, then abortion would not be bad for
the fetus. In other words, if the fetus is expected
to have a life of pain, or a life where the baseline is a negative state of well-being, then abortion
would not deprive it of any higher states of wellbeing at any time had it not been carried out. Here,
the relative notion of the Time-Focused Deprivation Account becomes particularly clear since the
goodness or badness of abortion would be relative
to the potential goodness or badness (i.e., quality)
of the fetus’s life before and after abortion. Thus,
proponents of the Hedonic View would assert that
abortion is not bad (or good) for the fetus, and the
proponents of the Time-Focused Deprivation account would base their argument on the quality of
fetus’s before and after abortion.
6. Conclusion
Relativity to a hypothetical future and a state
of well-being is a crucial factor in the TimeFocused Deprivation account to evaluate whether
death is good or bad for the person who dies. If
death deprives one of a higher state of well-being
at a time had it not occurred, then it is bad for the
person who dies. However, if that person’s life, on
balance, confers an overall negative state of wellbeing (due to an illness, for example), then it can
be argued that death is not bad for that person because it will end his negative state of well-being
that will continue had his death never happened.
Differently, the Hedonic Account follows the Epicurean argument and assigns no value (good or
bad) to death and thus asserts that death cannot
be bad for the one who dies. Additionally, Hedonists (like Taylor) would expand the argument
that a person’s death is the end of his/her existence and thus the end of his/her capacity to be-
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come subject to any future emotions or experiences. Accordingly, I have shown that Neil Feit’s
argument is undermined by the no-value account
of death propagated by the Hedonic View. Therefore, it is implausible, from a Time-Focused Deprivationist standpoint, to argue against the Hedonic View. Additionally, I have demonstrated (with
the “vacuum” instance) that Feit’s Time-Focused
Deprivation Account of death is very limited and
cannot be applied to all instances of death, unlike
Taylor’s Hedonic View, which makes the latter a
stronger argument for how death is not bad (or
good) for the person who dies. Moreover, I have
evaluated both Taylor’s Hedonic View and Feit’s
time-focused Deprivation account in the context
of multiple real-life scenarios. In each case, the
Hedonic premise that death has no value for the
person who dies and, therefore, death cannot be
bad (or good) for that person still holds true. Nevertheless, the death of that person can be good or
bad for others, depending on whether that death
confers a state of positive or negative well-being
on them. Thus, to evaluate the value of death for
a person, the Hedonic View forces the viewer to
expand the evaluation of death from its exclusive
relation to the deceased, who can no longer experience good or bad, to its relation to those who are
still alive and related to the deceased; those who
can still experience the goodness and badness of
events. If death can only be evaluated in relation
to the deceased, then the Hedonic View might be
limited in its real-life practical and ethical applications because it would simply be unable to assign any values to the event of death on its own.
On the other hand, Feit’s Time-Focused Deprivation account would state that in each of these cases
death deprives the person who dies from a higher
level of well-being at a time had it not occurred
making it bad for the person who dies, with the
reservation that said person’s life did, on balance,
grant an overall state of positive well-being before
death.
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